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Predictive Policing and the Ethics of Preemption
Daniel  Susser
The American justice system, from police departments to the courts, 
is increasingly turning to information technology for help in iden-
tifying potential offenders; determining where, geographically, to 
allocate enforcement resources; assessing flight risk and the potential 
for recidivism among arrestees; and making other judgments about 
when, where, and how to manage crime. In particular, there is a focus 
on machine learning and other data analytics tools, which promise to 
accurately predict where crime will occur and who will perpetrate it. 
Activists and academics have begun to raise critical questions about 
the use of these tools in policing contexts. In this chapter, I review the 
emerging critical literature on predictive policing and contribute to it 
by raising ethical questions about the use of predictive analytics tools 
to identify potential offenders. Drawing from work on the ethics of 
profiling, I argue that the much- lauded move from reactive to pre-
emptive policing can mean wrongfully generalizing about individuals, 
making harmful assumptions about them, instrumentalizing them, 
and failing to respect them as full ethical persons. I suggest that these 
problems stem both from the nature of predictive policing tools and 
from the sociotechnical contexts in which they are implemented. 
Which is to say, the set of ethical issues I describe arises not only 
from the fact that these tools are predictive, but also from the fact that 
they are situated in the hands of police. To mitigate these problems, I 
suggest we place predictive policing tools in the hands of those whose 
ultimate responsibility is to individuals (such as counselors and social 
workers), rather than in the hands of those, like the police, whose 
ultimate duty is to protect the public at large.
* Uncorrected Proofs *
Forthcoming in Ben Jones and Eduardo Mendieta (ed.),
The Ethics of Policing: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (NYU Press), 2021
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From Reactive to Preemptive Policing
Law enforcement has always utilized a mixture of reactive and proac-
tive strategies, but several historical factors have conspired over the 
past few decades to give proactive approaches pride of place. First, 
rising crime rates in the 1960s and ’70s led American police depart-
ments to question the largely reactive approaches of the middle part 
of the twentieth century, and shift toward what came to be known 
as “community policing” (Uchida 2005; Walsh 2005). Developments 
such as “broken windows” theory and problem- oriented policing in 
the 1980s and 1990s represented a change in “the definition of polic-
ing from one of crime control to one of community problem- solving 
and empowerment” (Uchida 2005, 36). That is, police departments 
began to focus their efforts on working with community members 
to transform the social and environmental conditions that encour-
age crime— in order to prevent it— rather than merely responding to 
criminal behavior.1
The second historical factor was the rise of Compstat. Through-
out the 1990s, William Bratton led the development of an approach to 
policing— first at the New York City Police Department, and then widely 
adopted elsewhere (Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd 2004)— which 
“builds upon the police organizational paradigms of the past and blends 
them with the strategic management fundamentals of the business sec-
tor” (Walsh 2005, 206). Central to that enterprise was the incorpora-
tion of huge amounts of data into law enforcement practice.2 While the 
Compstat model retained community policing’s bottom- up orientation, 
allowing precinct commanders to determine local enforcement strate-
gies, it introduced strict accountability from on high (Walsh and Vito 
2004; Walsh 2005). To do so, the Compstat system required highly for-
malized data collection and processing to provide managers reliable, 
up- to- date information with which to conduct “relentless assessment” 
of their subordinates (Walsh and Vito 2004, 59; Willis, Mastrofski, and 
Weisburd 2007). But this turn to data- driven policing did more than 
facilitate new management processes; it enabled a change in focus from 
individual cases to larger crime patterns now visible in the data (Willis, 
Mastrofski, and Weisburd 2004), and a further entrenchment of the idea 
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that policing is about preventing crime rather than merely controlling 
it (Walsh 2005).
Finally, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Understood by 
many as being, at bottom, a failure of information sharing among intel-
ligence and law enforcement agencies, 9/11 resulted in an even greater 
emphasis on data- driven approaches to crime control and the rise of 
“intelligence- led policing” (Ratcliffe 2008). As Sarah Brayne (2017) ar-
gues, after 9/11 local police came to be viewed as “actors on the front 
lines of the domestic war against terror,” leading local and federal law 
enforcement organizations to work together “to assess the viability of a 
more predictive approach to policing” (981). The emphasis on prediction 
and prevention over reaction and response was cemented in the process.
Alongside this historical and organizational background, in which 
police departments increasingly prioritized proactive policing strategies 
over reactive ones, one also finds the emergence of specific predictive 
tools in law enforcement practice. Although much of the emerging pub-
lic discourse around predictive policing treats it as a fundamentally new 
phenomenon, police departments have long collected crime data, and 
they have long used it to make decisions about where limited resources 
ought to be devoted (Pearsall 2010; Perry et al. 2013).3 Until the advent 
of big data– driven analytics tools, this generally took the form of “crime 
mapping”— using information about where and what kinds of crimes 
have occurred in order to identify patterns useful for making forward- 
looking predictions about where criminal activity is likely to take place 
in the future. According to a report from the National Institute of Justice 
(NIJ) (the research arm of the US Department of Justice), this kind of 
“crime analysis” has been in use since at least the turn of the twentieth 
century, and perhaps longer (Harries 1999, 1), and was central to early 
iterations of Compstat (Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd 2004).4 Many 
will recognize the pre- digital form of this strategy in the physical maps 
on police department walls, with push- pins or other markers designat-
ing recent police activity, from films and television police procedurals.
As the NIJ report argues, crime mapping techniques developed 
piecemeal until the 1990s, when two concurrent trends marked a shift 
in their evolution: first, the incorporation of computers (especially geo-
graphic information systems, or GIS) into mapping and visualization 
practices, and second, the professionalization of crime analysis, includ-
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ing the introduction of insights from academic criminology, geography, 
and cartography (Harries 1999, 3– 6). Computerizing crime mapping of-
fered several obvious advantages— it made it possible to analyze more 
information, to keep better track of trends (since old maps could be 
easily retained for comparison as new information was added, unlike 
what was possible with physical maps and push- pins), and as the cost of 
computers declined, more departments gained access to the tools and 
techniques of digital crime analysis (Harries 1999, 3– 6). The profession-
alization of crime mapping, or what is sometimes called “crime fore-
casting” (Perry et al. 2013)— especially the incorporation of academic 
research into its ongoing development— meant that it could be driven 
by more than tacit knowledge (e.g., the beat cop’s familiarity with his or 
her route) and intuition, as social scientific theories designed to explain 
when, where, and why crime occurs were used to refine the analyses 
(Eck et al. 2005).5
Today, advanced crime mapping tools have been packaged into off- 
the- shelf products available for purchase by law enforcement agencies, 
without the need for in- house experts. PredPol and HunchLab are, per-
haps, the most widely adopted and frequently discussed. Developed 
by anthropologist Jeffrey Brantingham and computer scientist George 
Mohler, PredPol analyzes data about when, where, and what kinds of 
crimes have occurred (focusing mainly on non- violent crime), in order 
to predict where hotspots are likely to emerge. As of early 2019, the soft-
ware had been purchased and deployed in “dozens” of US municipalities 
(Haskins and Koebler 2019). HunchLab works in a similar way, though 
it implements an allegedly more advanced method of hotspot predic-
tion known as “Risk Terrain Modeling,” which incorporates information 
about environmental factors, such as the presence of pawnshops and 
public transportation (which are correlated, for example, with higher 
burglary rates) into the predictions (Caplan and Kennedy 2011; Cham-
mah 2016).
Crime mapping is fundamentally spatiotemporally oriented or place- 
based, the aim being to use information about historical crime patterns 
to identify “hot spots”— places and periods of time prone to above- 
average criminal activity (Eck et al. 2005; Perry et al. 2013). In addition 
to trying to predict where and when crime will occur, however, law en-
forcement agencies have also long attempted to understand who is likely 
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to be involved in criminal activity— either as a perpetrator or a victim. 
According to Andrew Ferguson (2016), such “person- based”6 predictive 
policing strategies developed independently of the spatiotemporally ori-
ented varieties described above, emerging from public health research 
focused on crime. “For decades,” he writes, “sociologists identified the 
reality that a small subset of individuals in any community committed 
the vast majority of crimes. Police recognized that targeting those in-
dividuals could result in a disproportionate reduction of crime rates” 
(Ferguson 2016, 713).
This idea— that specific people, and groups of people, not just specific 
places and times— are statistically more likely to be implicated in crimi-
nal activity, led to the introduction of social network analysis into crime 
prediction. The premise of social network analysis is that sociological 
phenomena (such as crime) can be explained and predicted in part by 
the types and structures of social relationships that connect individuals 
(Borgatti et al. 2009). In the context of criminology, the relevant rela-
tionships or networks of interest have largely been gangs, drug dealing 
operations, and the mafia, all understood to be nexuses of crime. By 
analyzing the social networks of known offenders, police can identify 
others statistically likely to be involved in future criminal activity (Fer-
guson 2016; Tayebi and Glässer 2016).
As with crime mapping, the rise of cheap, powerful data- driven tech-
nologies meant new possibilities for social network analysis, as well as 
new insights into the correlations between other empirically observ-
able phenomena and the potential for involvement in criminal activity. 
 Contemporary person- based modeling “creates risk profiles for indi-
viduals in the criminal justice system on the basis of age, criminal re-
cord, employment history, and social affiliations” (Shapiro 2017). These 
profiles are then used to identify potential offenders and score their risk 
of involvement in future crimes. The Chicago Police Department, for 
example, maintains a “Strategic Subjects List” (or “heat list”) which con-
tains information on thousands of citizens (Rosenblat, Kneese, and boyd 
2014; Dumke and Main 2017). Although the vast majority of people on 
the list have some kind of criminal record, not all do, and many (13 per-
cent) have never been charged with a violent crime (Dumke and Main 
2017). Person- based predictive policing technologies like Chicago’s heat 
list are, at the moment, less prevalent in the field than place- based tools 
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(Degeling and Berendt 2018), but their use is growing, having already 
been adopted by police departments in New Orleans, Los Angeles, Kan-
sas City, and Rochester, New York (Ferguson 2017b).
These tools are changing how police perceive and interact with 
the public in important ways. First, as Sarah Brayne (2017) argues, 
 data- driven policing means the police are able to effectively surveil an 
unprecedentedly large number of people. Network analysis, as we just 
saw, leads to people who have never had any contact with the police 
appearing in databases of potential offenders. And datasets from across 
public sector institutions are being integrated into police surveillance 
systems, meaning any contact with the state can potentially bring indi-
viduals to law enforcement’s attention. Police officers no longer have to 
“actively search” for persons of interest, either. Instead, “passive alerts” 
notify officers whenever individuals matching certain profiles are found 
in the system. As Elizabeth Joh writes, “new technologies have altered 
surveillance discretion by lowering its costs and increasing the capabili-
ties of the police to identify suspicious persons” (2016, 15).
In addition to preemptively identifying people for police scrutiny, 
predictive policing tools increasingly mediate encounters between in-
dividuals and police through risk assessments and threat scores. In-
trado’s “Beware” system, for example, claims to “help first responders 
understand the nature of the environment they may encounter during 
the window of a 9- 1- 1 event.”7 Using information collected from public 
crime data, social media, and commercial data brokers, the system is-
sues color- coded assessments— green, yellow, red— designed to indicate 
how dangerous an individual is to law enforcement (Robinson and Ko-
epke 2016). As Ferguson argues, such assessments obviously
distort the day- to- day police decisions about use of force and reasonable 
suspicion. After all, once police have information that a person has a high 
threat score, this knowledge will color criminal suspicion and increase 
perceived danger, resulting in more frequent and more aggressive inter-
actions with people the algorithm deems “high risk.” (Ferguson 2017c)
Taken together, the historical trajectory of American law enforce-
ment away from reactive and toward proactive approaches, and the 
introduction of increasingly data- driven, predictive tools into the ev-
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eryday work of police, represent what Brayne calls “a migration of law 
enforcement operations toward intelligence activities” (2017, 986). “[L]
aw enforcement,” she writes, “typically becomes involved once a crimi-
nal incident has occurred. . . . Intelligence, by contrast, is fundamentally 
predictive. Intelligence activities involve gathering data; identifying 
suspicious patterns, locations, activities, and individuals; and preemp-
tively intervening based on the intelligence acquired” (Brayne 2017, 
986). Obviously, such intelligence- driven, preemptive policing creates 
different risks and, when it goes wrong, threatens different harms than 
traditional, reactive law enforcement (Maguire 2000). And so this mi-
gration toward predictive, preemptive policing brings with it different 
ethical challenges.
Critical Responses to Predictive Policing
Activists and academics have raised a number of concerns about 
data- driven predictive policing techniques. First, many watching the 
emergence of predictive policing technologies and their integration into 
everyday policing practice worry, above all, about the lack of transpar-
ency around how these technologies work (what data they collect, the 
statistical methods used to analyze that data, etc.), how they are being 
deployed, and the concomitant absence of accountability (Dumke and 
Main 2017; Robinson and Koepke 2016). As Ferguson argues, this is 
in part simply the latest iteration of an old problem, given that “police 
accountability has long been a fraught issue” (2017a, 1168). But predic-
tive technologies introduce new problematic dynamics: the tools are 
extremely complex, requiring special expertise to audit them; they are 
generally powered by proprietary algorithms, owned by private firms 
reluctant (and, so far, uncompelled) to reveal their inner workings; 
and they are still nascent technologies undergoing constant innovation 
and change (Ferguson 2017a). Such problems notwithstanding, calls 
for increased transparency around predictive policing technologies are 
growing (Robinson and Koepke 2016; Schmidt 2018; Zarsky 2013), mir-
roring concerns about algorithmic opacity in other contexts, such as 
credit scoring and search (Pasquale 2015).
Second, critics have raised questions about accuracy and bias. Wor-
ries about bias in predictive policing technologies are a special case of 
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concerns about “algorithmic bias” more generally, an issue stemming 
from realizations— beginning in the mid- 1990s— that computers can 
encode and perpetuate discriminatory effects on their users and others 
impacted by their operations (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1996). More 
recently, it has become apparent that the class of computational tech-
niques known as machine learning— which drives a majority of predic-
tive tools— is especially vulnerable to this problem.8 Because machine 
learning tools “learn” to make predictions from patterns latent in the 
data they are trained on, their predictions carry forward any biases or 
other effects of discrimination reflected in that data. Given the history 
of discrimination against Black and minority populations in the United 
States, predictive policing algorithms trained on historical data are likely 
to perpetuate and reinforce racial biases (Ferguson 2017a; Kutnowski 
2017; Selbst 2017; Shapiro 2017). And indeed, that is what we have al-
ready begun to see. An algorithm for predicting potential recidivism, 
commonly used in courts around the US to make bail, sentencing, and 
parole decisions, is more likely to erroneously flag Black offenders as 
dangerous than White offenders (Angwin et al. 2016), and place- based 
predictive algorithms used by police departments to determine where 
and when to deploy officers results in the disproportionate over- policing 
of majority Black neighborhoods (Lum and Isaac 2016).
A third— related— strand of critique looks not at bias in training data, 
but rather at the feedback loops and multiplier effects that can result 
from putting predictive algorithms into practice. When predictive polic-
ing tools are deployed in the field, they continue to collect data, which 
is then used to update and refine their predictive models. As a result, 
the models become trained over time on a disproportionate amount 
of information about the people and places they directed law enforce-
ment to in the first place, producing feedback loops (Ensign et al. 2018). 
People and places historically discriminated against thus become targets 
of police attention (leading to more arrests, etc.), which leads to data 
that appears to confirm the original predictions. As Kristian Lum and 
William Isaac write, “newly observed criminal acts that police docu-
ment as a result of these targeted patrols then feed into the predictive 
policing algorithm on subsequent days, generating increasingly biased 
predictions. This creates a feedback loop where the model becomes in-
creasingly confident that the locations most likely to experience further 
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criminal activity are exactly the locations they had previously believed 
to be high in crime: selection bias meets confirmation bias” (2016, 16; see 
also Ferguson 2017a).9
Finally, some have asked not about the predictions of predictive polic-
ing, nor about the enforcement dynamics the predictions produce, but 
rather about how predictive technologies change the way people think 
about and understand the role of law enforcement generally. Bernard 
Harcourt articulated an early version of this worry in Against Prediction 
(2007). Tracing the history of what he calls “actuarial approaches” to polic-
ing (meaning predictive approaches grounded in statistical methods), he 
argues that beyond concerns about the accuracy of statistical models or 
the utility of such models for actually preventing crimes (concerns he also 
raises), a more fundamental problem with incorporating predictive tools 
into law enforcement practice is the effect it has on our conception of the 
law enforcement enterprise. Just as holding a hammer makes everything 
look like a nail, reliance on statistical methods for structuring the work of 
law enforcement reshapes our understanding of that work in its actuarial 
image. “We have come to associate the prediction of future criminality with 
just punishment,” Harcourt writes. “This seems intuitively obvious, even 
necessary. . . . But, the fact is, we have chosen this conception of just pun-
ishment. . . . We chose it as against a rehabilitative model and as against a 
more strictly retributivist model” (2007, 31– 32). As the work of law enforce-
ment has come to be understood fundamentally in terms of predicting and 
mitigating risk, the rationale for subjecting people to law’s coercive force 
has likewise reoriented toward people’s predicted riskiness.10
In what follows, I continue in the vein of this last strand of critique, 
raising questions about the effects of predictive technologies on the 
treatment of individuals by the state. Specifically, I attempt to shed light 
on some ethical ramifications of person- based predictive policing— law 
enforcement officials singling out individuals for investigative scrutiny 
on the basis of algorithmically generated predictions. I leave questions 
about the ethics of place- based predictive policing to the side.
Problems with Profiling
As we’ve seen, person- based predictive policing is, in effect, a data- driven 
form of profiling. Unlike the beat cop evaluating someone’s suspicious 
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behavior in the moment, predictive policing tools evaluate individuals 
on the basis of whether they are a certain type— the kind of person who 
is likely to commit a crime.11 Using information about who has commit-
ted past crimes12 (their age, employment history, social networks, and 
so on), law enforcement generates “risk profiles”— assessments of how 
similar individuals are to past perpetrators, and thus how likely they are 
to engage in future criminal activity (Shapiro 2017). While the technol-
ogy driving this kind of profiling is new, the underlying idea is not. Law 
enforcement has long engaged in low- tech forms of profiling, and schol-
ars and advocates have raised concerns about the ethical ramifications 
of such strategies. To understand the ethics of person- based predictive 
policing, it therefore helps to consider arguments about the ethics of 
profiling more generally.
Profiling and Generalization
First, it is perhaps important to distinguish the sort of profiling at 
issue here from what has traditionally been referred to as “criminal 
profiling”— i.e., the use of crime scene evidence to infer the perpetrator’s 
personality in order to guide an investigation (Gregory 2005; Turvey 
2012). Such profiling works backward from an actual crime to an actual 
criminal (rather than a potential crime and potential criminal). Though 
data analytics tools are today frequently used to aid criminal profilers, 
and such tools are sometimes described using the umbrella term “pre-
dictive policing,” they raise substantially different ethical questions than 
those raised by the predictive tools that identify individuals likely to 
commit future crimes (Perry et al. 2013).13 My argument in what follows 
does not bear on criminal profiling, at least directly.
A more familiar and more relevant strategy is racial profiling— 
selecting people for differential treatment on the basis of their race. 
Racial profiling, especially in the context of law enforcement, has long 
been a subject of controversy. Discussions about whether it is morally 
acceptable for law enforcement to engage in racial profiling are relevant 
to debates about the ethics of predictive policing for at least two rea-
sons. First, both racial profiling and person- based predictive or algorith-
mic profiling involve preemptive interventions by law enforcement. For 
reasons discussed above, police departments have become increasingly 
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focused on preventing crime, rather than merely responding to it. The 
purpose of both racial profiling and predictive profiling is to determine 
in advance of any outwardly suspicious behavior whether or not par-
ticular individuals are especially likely to commit a crime, and to inter-
vene before they do. Second, in both cases the method of making such 
determinations is statistical inference. Which is to say, in the absence 
of outwardly suspicious behavior, judgments about individual risk are 
made by examining the statistical correlations between an individual’s 
group memberships and criminality more generally.
Examples of racial profiling by law enforcement abound. Customs 
agents have disproportionately subjected African American women to 
invasive treatment at US airports (Schauer 2003). In cases of so- called 
“pretext stops,” Black drivers have been disproportionately stopped and 
searched on US roads (Hosein 2018). Arab and Muslim people in the 
US— especially after 9/11— have been targeted with suspicion simply be-
cause of their race or religion, and they have been singled out for ques-
tioning and other forms of differential treatment by law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies (Hosein 2018). Such practices are so preva-
lent that in 2009 the American Civil Liberties Union reported that “the 
practice of racial profiling by members of law enforcement at the fed-
eral, state, and local levels remains a widespread and pervasive problem 
throughout the United States, impacting the lives of millions of people 
in African American, Asian, Latino, South Asian, and Arab communi-
ties” (American Civil Liberties Union and The Rights Working Group 
2009).
Like the predictive or algorithmic profiling described above, racial 
profiling is a form of “statistical discrimination” (Lippert- Rasmussen 
2014; Schauer 2018). Which is to say, it involves sorting or classifying 
people on the basis of observable traits assumed to be statistically corre-
lated with some target characteristic. In the case of intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies racially profiling Arab Americans, for example, it 
is assumed that race or ethnicity is meaningfully statistically correlated 
with the propensity for terrorist acts. Because what law enforcement is 
interested in— the disposition to terrorism— is not easily observable, 
race is used as a proxy. Person- based predictive policing tools work the 
same way. What law enforcement wants to know— whether someone 
is especially likely to commit a crime— cannot be directly observed, so 
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proxy attributes are used instead. Age, employment status, past criminal 
charges, and other characteristics statistically correlated with criminal-
ity are used as the basis for discriminating between those who pose the 
least and those who pose the greatest risks for future criminal behavior.
“Discrimination” has a pejorative connotation, and racial profil-
ing has often been criticized for being discriminatory. As Frederick 
Schauer argues, however, discrimination cannot itself be the problem, 
because acting on the basis of statistical inferences of the sort just de-
scribed is unavoidable. At a basic level, to discriminate simply means 
to make value- laden distinctions. We discriminate when we choose to 
eat tasty rather than bland foods, when we go for walks on clear rather 
than rainy days, and when we hire charismatic rather than lackluster 
job candidates. And making these kinds of distinctions almost always 
requires statistical inferences. Having previously found a certain brand 
of food bland, we infer that it is very likely the same brand will be bland 
this time. Because we found that previous job candidates who lacked 
charisma during their interviews were ultimately unmotivated in their 
positions, we assume that this uncharismatic job candidate would be 
unmotivated in this position too. Inductive reasoning— making general-
izations— is fundamental to human judgment (Schauer 2003).
That racial profiling seems to many intuitively morally unacceptable 
therefore cannot be explained simply by the fact that it involves statisti-
cal discrimination.14 Rather, for Schauer, racial profiling is ethically sus-
pect because it involves bad statistics. In most cases of profiling on the 
basis of race (or, equally, gender, sexual orientation, or other social cat-
egories), the alleged correlations between such categories and most tar-
get characteristics simply turn out to be spurious (Schauer 2003).15 Even 
though some people think women, as a group, lack business acumen, or 
gay men lack physical courage— to take Schauer’s examples— there is no 
justification for those beliefs (Schauer 2003). Such generalizations (or 
“stereotypes”) about social groups are just wrong. They are prejudices, 
not sound inductive inferences. Judging individuals on the basis of false 
generalizations about the social groups of which they are members is 
wrong, because it is highly likely that the judgments will be mistaken. As 
Schauer writes, “much of the history of unfortunate discrimination is a 
history of the erroneous belief in statistical relationships that turn out to 
have no basis in fact” (Schauer 2018, 47).
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Picking Proxies
But false generalizations are an easy case. What should we make of sta-
tistically well- grounded profiling? Is it acceptable to judge individuals 
on the basis of nonspurious correlations between group membership 
and target characteristics? If, in theory, race really was correlated with 
rates of criminality, would racial profiling be justified? Is it reasonable 
to assume that someone poses an especially high risk for future crim-
inal behavior just because they share certain traits in common with 
other criminals? Some argue that the answer is categorically no. Even 
in cases where there is a high degree of certainty that a generalization 
about someone will turn out to be true, it is wrong to make conse-
quential decisions about them on that basis, because the chance that 
the judgment is mistaken— however small— denies them the right to 
individualized treatment (see Schauer 2003, 20– 22; Lippert- Rasmussen 
2011, 2014, 275). The moral intuition behind this categorical rejection 
of statistical discrimination— that individuals ought not to be judged 
using generalizations about groups to which they belong, but rather 
only on the basis of their own particular characteristics— is powerful 
and widely shared.
As Schauer (2003) argues, the idea of individualized or particular-
ized judgment is implausible when taken to its extreme, because even 
judgments that seem on the face of it highly individualized are usu-
ally, at bottom, grounded in statistical inferences.16 However, critics 
of racial profiling need not argue that all profiling is unacceptable to 
demonstrate that racial profiling is. They only need to show that it is 
unacceptable to use race, specifically, as a proxy variable when mak-
ing certain kinds of judgments, such as whom to single out for police 
attention. Kasper Lippert- Rasmussen (2014) adopts this strategy, ar-
guing that using race as a proxy for criminality is wrong— even if it is 
sometimes statistically sound— because the history of discrimination 
against racial minorities is likely an important cause of disparate crime 
rates between races, and using that statistical disparity as a justifica-
tion for burdening minority groups offends norms of fairness. Adam 
Hosein (2018) argues it is wrong because using race as a proxy for 
criminality contributes to a sense of inferior political status among 
targeted racial minorities.
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Returning to the question of predictive policing, Schauer’s argu-
ment (that race is usually a poor proxy for other traits) and Lippert- 
Rasmussen’s and Hosein’s arguments (that even when race is a sound 
proxy it is probably wrong to use it) demonstrate that while statistical 
inference may be unavoidable, there are important ethical questions 
to consider about how such inferences are made. At the very least, in-
formation about race should be excluded from the datasets predictive 
policing algorithms analyze when generating risk scores. Moreover, 
since such arguments likely apply equally to other important “socially 
salient groups” or “protected attributes” besides race— such as gender, 
sexual orientation, and ability— we can reasonably conclude that data 
about membership in those groups ought to be excluded too (Lippert- 
Rasmussen 2014). And to some extent, this is what we find. Although, 
as we’ve seen, there is insufficient transparency around most existing 
predictive policing algorithms, some law enforcement agencies— such 
as the Chicago Police Department— insist that they do not use data 
about race to generate their scores (Dumke and Main 2017; Stroud 
2014).
There is reason to worry, however, that this solution— excluding cer-
tain kinds of information from predictive policing algorithms— while 
laudable, is insufficient. Namely, it is a feature of machine learning algo-
rithms (which are, again, the computational technique underlying most 
predictive policing systems) that they will find proxies for meaningful 
variables regardless of whether or not those variables are explicitly in-
troduced into the system. As Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst write: 
“Even in situations where data miners are extremely careful, they can 
still effect discriminatory results with models that, quite unintention-
ally, pick out proxy variables for protected classes” (2016, 675). Indeed, 
the veneer of mathematical objectivity offered by algorithmic assess-
ments can in fact serve to mask the ways such assessments further en-
trench racial bias in policing. “Mathematized police practices,” writes 
Brayne, “serve to place individuals already under suspicion under new 
and deeper forms of surveillance, while appearing to be objective, or, in 
the words of one captain, ‘just math’” (2017, 997, emphasis in original). 
Thus, predictive profiling doesn’t merely raise similar ethical questions 
to those raised by racial profiling, it threatens to reintroduce racial pro-
filing in a new guise.17
282 | Daniel  Susser
Past as Prologue
Social group membership is not the only kind of proxy variable deserv-
ing of critical scrutiny. The language of “predictive policing” evokes 
a sense of futurity, an orientation toward what has yet to come. But, 
of course, predictions must be generated out of something, and that 
something is data about the past.18 The people on the Chicago Police 
Department’s heat list are there not because of anything they are doing 
in this moment; the list is updated frequently, but not in real time. They 
are on the list because they have been charged with crimes in the past, 
or they have been the victims of crime, or because they have been asso-
ciated with known offenders, or because they are a certain age (Dumke 
and Main 2017). They may not have done anything remotely indicative of 
potential criminality in some time— for those on the list simply because 
they were the victims of crime, they may never have acted suspiciously— 
and yet the Strategic Subjects List indicates to law enforcement that they 
are a risk, a potential threat, and that they ought to be treated as such.
As we’ve seen, this is part of a larger trend away from reactive policing 
postures, toward preventive or preemptive ones. Prior to the emergence 
of intelligence- led policing, individuals were generally singled out for 
police attention because they were engaged— in the moment— in suspi-
cious acts (Brayne 2017). Racial profiling is an exception to that rule, 
and person- based predictive policing technologies encourage another. 
Chicago’s Strategic Subjects List and other systems like it enable police 
to identify purportedly “high- risk” individuals by comparing them with 
known criminals who have similar biographies— similar criminal re-
cords, similar histories of criminal victimization, past associations with 
similar people. Which is to say, they allow the police to generalize about 
individuals using not race but history as a proxy for potential criminal-
ity. Once high- risk individuals are identified, they are subjected to dif-
ferential treatment. In the Chicago case, this means visits from teams of 
police officers warning that they are under extra scrutiny (Gorner 2013; 
Stroud 2014). As we saw above, it can also mean police officers in the 
field approaching purportedly high- risk individuals with greater vigi-
lance (Ferguson 2017c).
This kind of predictive strategy— using information about people’s 
past associations, past behaviors, past run- ins with the law to make pre-
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dictions about their risk of future criminality— freezes people, Medusa- 
like, in their pasts, suspending them, condemning them to permanent 
stigmatization. Once identified by the system as a potential threat (a 
“strategic subject”), a person’s history is set in stone and they are marked 
by the state as inalterably suspicious. As Bonnie Sheehey argues, the pre-
dictive system
codifies and stabilizes the past, turning it both into something that is 
bound to repeat in the future and into something that can be securely 
acted on in the present. This codification of the past in the form of data 
functions to close the past off from possibilities of what could have been. 
No longer open or negotiable, the past gets preformed and packaged in 
the shape of data as something already given. (Sheehey 2018, 8)
Using a person’s history to mark them as suspicious in the present 
renders them the “type” of person who would, of course, have the 
kind of historical record they do. (As we saw in the case of place- 
based predictive policing: “selection bias meets confirmation bias.”) 
In doing so, their very identity becomes cause for suspicion— they 
become suspicious people. They need not engage in any overtly suspi-
cious behavior to attract attention from law enforcement, and, indeed, 
there is nothing they can do (or abstain from doing) to avoid such 
attention.19
These considerations suggest additional ethical concerns about police 
profiling, beyond those raised in the previous section. First, by mark-
ing individuals as suspicious people, regardless of any overtly suspicious 
behavior, predictive technologies rob them of the presumption of inno-
cence. Legally, in the US, that presumption is only formally required in 
court once someone has been charged with a crime.20 Morally, however, 
the right to be presumed innocent is broader than that. As Ian Kerr and 
Jessica Earle (2013) argue,
If the legal universe has a prime directive, it is probably the shared un-
derstanding that everyone is presumed innocent until proven guilty. . . . 
[T]he presumption of innocence and related private sector due process
values can be seen as wider moral claims that overlap and interrelate with
core privacy values. (Kerr and Earle 2013)
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The kind of “preemptive predictions” (to use Kerr and Earle’s term) pre-
dictive policing technologies generate— which is to say, predictions that 
serve to anticipate and constrain people’s behavior— undermine bedrock 
moral and legal values designed to “provide fair and equal treatment to 
all by setting boundaries around the kinds of assumptions that can and 
cannot be made about people” (Kerr and Earle 2013). Once someone 
is flagged by a person- based predictive policing algorithm, the police 
are authorized to make assumptions about them that they are forbidden 
from making about others.
At a deeper level, this treatment demonstrates a failure to recognize 
targeted individuals as full moral subjects. A hallmark of moral person-
hood is the capacity for agency— the ability, precisely, to thwart predic-
tions, to surprise. Presuming to know how individuals will behave in 
the future, and preemptively, punitively intervening on the basis of that 
assumption suggests one of two things: either that law enforcement is 
sure they are right about how targets will act in the future, or they think 
the benefits of guessing correctly outweigh the costs of getting it wrong. 
If the former is true, then the deployment of predictive policing tech-
nologies treats individuals as rigid, mechanical automata, rather than as 
dynamic, agential beings— that is, as moral subjects. If the latter is true, 
then the deployment of predictive policing technologies acknowledges 
that its targets are moral subjects but then proceeds to instrumentalize 
them, treating their interests as subservient to the interests of others. 
Whether the truth is closer to the former or the latter, its ethical pros-
pects are poor.
Of course, some will object that given the existence of predictive pro-
filing tools, and the significant threat of crime, it would be negligent for 
the police not to use them. As I suggest in closing, however, there is, in 
fact, a third option: the power of predictive profiling technologies could 
be harnessed by others besides the police.
Conclusion: Just Preemption
Philosophers and science and technology studies scholars have long 
argued that in order to evaluate the social and ethical implications 
of new and emerging technologies, it is not enough to investigate the 
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technologies themselves; one must explore the broader sociotechnical 
contexts in which technologies are developed and used (see, e.g., Latour 
2005; Pinch and Bijker 1984; Winner 1980). The question is not simply, 
“Is this technology good or bad? Does it promise to make things better 
or worse?” Rather, the question must be, “What does it mean for this 
technology to be developed and used in this way, in this context, by 
these particular social actors?”
I want to conclude by suggesting that the problems I have pointed to 
throughout this essay arise not simply from the predictive dimension 
of predictive policing technologies, but also from the fact that these 
technologies are situated in the hands of police. The duty of police of-
ficers is not only to individuals, but also to the public at large, and as a 
result, the work of policing is not fundamentally oriented to the inter-
ests of individuals, but rather to the public interest. Scholars of policing 
have shown that police work is far more complex and multifaceted than 
merely “enforcing the law,” and many police officers spend much of 
their time aiding individual citizens (see Bittner 1970; Goldstein 1977). 
But the principal goal of policing, its basic function, is ensuring pub-
lic safety.21 Advocates of community policing attempted to “rearrange 
priorities” among various police functions in the 1990s, de- prioritizing 
crime fighting and elevating individual assistance (Eck and Rosenbaum 
1994). As we saw above, however, the trend over the last two decades 
has been to reestablish crime prevention as law enforcement’s primary 
mission.22
It is in this context that the outputs of predictive policing algorithms— 
risk assessment scores, strategic subjects lists— are interpreted and acted 
upon. To be designated “high- risk” or a “strategic subject” means that 
one is a threat, a potential obstacle standing in the way of public safety. 
And it is this understanding that shapes the particular preemptive inter-
ventions made on the basis of such designations. Being identified as high 
risk or a strategic subject means facing heightened vigilance on the part 
of police (which can be dangerous to the person deemed a threat), or a 
visit from police officers warning that one is under heightened scrutiny 
(which can be embarrassing and demeaning, and a dangerous signal to 
others).23 The worries discussed in this chapter, about individualized 
judgment and racial stigmatization and the presumption of innocence 
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and potential instrumentalization, all carry normative force because it is 
police officers— people duty bound to promote the public interest over 
and above the interests of individuals, and authorized to use coercive 
force in carrying that duty out— who are making decisions on the basis 
of these predictions.
That these worries are in part a function of context suggests that 
they might be diffused if predictive profiling technologies were oth-
erwise situated.24 It is easy to imagine such tools driving the work of 
social services agencies, for example, rather than law enforcement.25 
In such a context, the prediction that someone was likely to commit a 
crime would mean something very different. Since the work of those 
who provide social services— such as social workers, counselors, and 
job placement officers— is oriented primarily toward the needs and in-
terests of individuals (and only indirectly toward the public interest), 
to them a person appearing on a strategic subjects list is not, in the first 
place, a threat, but rather someone in need of assistance.
If predictive profiling technologies were placed in the hands of so-
cial workers, or anyone else whose work is fundamentally oriented to 
each individual’s needs and interests, consider how the ethical questions 
raised throughout this essay would change: Is it unfair to generalize 
about someone in order to determine whether or not they need extra 
care? Are we comfortable treating someone as an underserved person, 
irrespective of any outwardly observable demonstrations of need, and 
to intervene preemptively to provide them with services? Is it acceptable 
to preemptively offer a person extra services, even at the risk that our 
predictions about their needs are proven wrong? By shifting the context 
in which predictive technologies guide people’s work, we shift the moral 
calculus. Rather than asking if and when it is right to make individuals 
absorb the costs of erring on the side of public safety, we ask if and when 
it is right to make the public absorb the costs of erring on the side of 
individual welfare.
The answer to this last question is not obviously “yes, always.” A 
world in which predictive profiling tools were given to social workers 
rather than the police would bring with it its own ethical tradeoffs and 
complexities. But that hypothetical world will likely strike many as more 
plausibly just than our own world, where such tools are controlled by 
the police.
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Notes
1 Community policing “seeks to turn patrol from a reactive to a proactive function” 
(Walsh 2005, 205).
2 Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd refer to Compstat as a “data- saturated environ-
ment” (2007, 148).
3 Perry et al. (2013, xiv) write: “We found a near one- to- one correspondence be-
tween conventional crime analysis and investigative methods and the more recent 
‘predictive analytics’ methods that mathematically extend or automate the earlier 
methods.”
4 Jennifer Bachner (2014) points to examples of crime visualization from as far back 
as 1829 in France, and claims that crime analysis of this sort was in regular use in 
mid- nineteenth century England, predating the establishment of formal police 
forces in the United States.
5 A number of theoretical frameworks have been used to support place- based 
crime forecasting, from “repeat victimization theory” to “routine activity theory” 
to “broken windows theory,” each pointing to a different set of environmental fac-
tors correlated with criminal activity. See Eck et al. (2005).
6 This is sometimes referred to as “offender- based predictive policing.” I prefer to 
follow Robinson and Koepke (2016) in calling it “person- based,” as many of those 
identified by such tools turn out not to be offenders at all.
7 From Intrado’s website (www.intrado.com/beware), quoted in Joh (2016, 24).
8 An entire field has quickly emerged in response to the problem of bias in machine 
learning algorithms. Work presented at its flagship conference, “FAT*: ACM Con-
ference on Fairness, Accuracy, and Transparency,” gives a sense of the scope of the 
problem and methods for remedying it. See https://fatconference.org.
9 Bernard Harcourt (2007) locates this dynamic in pre– machine learning predictive 
tools as well; he calls it the “Ratchet Effect.”
 10 Sheehey (2018) raises related questions.
 11 A different class of automated technologies, which Michael Rich (2016) calls 
“Automated Suspicion Algorithms,” do in fact examine behavior in real time, in 
addition to historical, demographic, and social network information.
 12 Or more precisely, who has been charged with committing past crimes.
 13 For a discussion of ethical issues in criminal profiling, see Boylan (2011) and 
Turvey (2012).
 14 For a qualified defense of racial profiling, see Risse and Zeckhauser (2004).
 15 However, Schauer defends the use of profiling in many cases where the statistical 
correlation between the proxy attribute and the target attribute holds.
 16 Even judgments based on direct observations of individuals are usually made by 
comparing what one is observing, probabilistically, with previous, similar obser-
vations.
 17 Hanni Fakhoury, a staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, said about 
this: “It ends up being a self- fulfilling prophecy. The algorithm is telling you exactly 
what you programmed it to tell you. ‘Young black kids in the south side of Chicago 
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are more likely to commit crimes,’ and the algorithm lets the police launder this 
belief. It’s not racism, they can say. They are making the decision based on what 
the algorithm is, even though the algorithm is going to spit back what you put into 
it. And if the data is biased to begin with and based on human judgment, then the 
results the algorithm is going to spit out will reflect those biases” (Llenas 2014).
 18 According to the New York Times, the Chicago Police Department’s Strategic 
Subjects List “draws, the police say, on variables tied to a person’s past behavior, 
particularly arrests and convictions, to predict who is most likely to become a 
‘party to violence’” (Davey 2017).
 19 Interestingly, this dynamic arguably exhibits the logic of racialization. Beyond the 
fact that the machine learning algorithms driving these systems very likely iden-
tify and incorporate proxies for race in their calculations— i.e., despite best efforts, 
race is likely an input— race is also, in some sense, an output. These systems create 
classificatory hierarchies of relative risk and they subject members of the different 
classificatory groups to systematically different treatment. Those deemed un-
threatening are left alone; those deemed risky are subjected to heightened surveil-
lance and the promise of more severe punishment if found engaging in criminal 
behavior.
 20 Predictive policing is not “pre- crime”— the law enforcement bureau from Philip 
K. Dick’s “Minority Report,” that incarcerates people for crimes they are predicted
to, but have not yet, committed— though some argue that predictive policing
moves us in that direction (see McCulloch and Wilson 2016).
 21 Jerome Hall writes that “organized police forces have functioned every-
where and at all times to maintain order principally by preventing crimes and 
 apprehending offenders” (1953, 139). Walsh and Vito claim that “Police depart-
ments are created to provide public safety for a defined governmental jurisdic-
tion” (2004, 51).
 22 Indeed, as Johnny Nhan writes, it is characteristic of contemporary “police culture” 
that “Most officers marginalize activities that are not oriented toward law enforce-
ment as not ‘real’ police work and consider such peacekeeping activities as a form 
of ‘social work’” (2013, 5). See also Sierra- Arévalo’s contribution in this volume.
 23 A Chicago Tribune article describes one person’s reaction to being identified as a 
strategic subject: “Interviewed at his Austin home, McDaniel said he was offended 
at being singled out by West, commander of the Austin police district. All the at-
tention made him nervous because his neighbors noticed, leading them, he feared, 
to wonder if he was a police snitch. Two officers waited outside on the porch while 
the commander and a criminal justice expert spoke to McDaniel in his home. ‘Like 
I said, I have no (criminal) background, so what would even give you probable 
cause to watch me?’ said McDaniel, a high school dropout. ‘And if you’re watching 
me, then you can obviously see I’m not doing anything’” (Gorner 2013).
 24 Kutnowski (2017) makes a similar suggestion about place- based predictive polic-
ing tools, arguing that they should reside not with police but rather with policy 
makers and urban planners. But he offers a different rationale.
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 25 Indeed, in Chicago, the police often bring social workers with them when they 
visit strategic subjects, or they provide them with information about how to 
access social services. Because the overall context is law enforcement, however, 
the goal of treating the underlying causes of criminal behavior necessarily takes 
a back- seat role to the goal of deterring it. For example, as Ferguson points 
out (quoting Andrew Papachristos and David Kirk), when Chicago police and 
prosecutors visit gang members on the Strategic Subjects List, “the point of the 
message stresses the deterrent aspect of the program,” and informs the target that, 
if they are caught misbehaving, “you will be punished harder because you were 
warned” (Ferguson 2016, 718– 19).
Bibliography
American Civil Liberties Union and The Rights Working Group. 2009. The Persistence 
of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States: A Follow- up Report to the U.N. 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. www.aclu.org.
Angwin, Julia, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, and Lauren Kirchner. 2016. “Machine Bias.” 
ProPublica, May 23, 2016. www.propublica.org.
Bachner, Jennifer. 2014. “Predictive Policing: Preventing Crime with Data and 
 Analytics.” IBM Center for the Business of Government.
Barocas, Solon, and Andrew D. Selbst. 2016. “Big Data’s Disparate Impact.” California 
Law Review 104 (3): 671– 732.
Bittner, Egon. 1970. The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of 
 Background Factors, Current Practices, and Possible Role Models. Chevy Chase, MD: 
National Institutes of Mental Health.
Borgatti, Stephen P., Ajay Mehra, Daniel J. Brass, and Giuseppe Labianca. 2009. “Net-
work Analysis in the Social Sciences.” Science 323 (5916): 892– 95.
Boylan, Michael. 2011. “Ethical Profiling.” Journal of Ethics 15 (1– 2): 131– 45.
Brayne, Sarah. 2017. “Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing.” American Sociologi-
cal Review 82 (5): 977– 1008.
Caplan, Joel M., and Leslie Kennedy W., eds. 2011. Risk Terrain Modeling Compendium: 
For Crime Analysis. Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers Center on Public Security.
Chammah, Maurice. 2016. “Policing the Future.” The Verge, February 3, 2016. www 
.theverge.com.
Davey, Monica. 2017. “Chicago Police Try to Predict Who May Shoot or Be Shot.” New 
York Times, December 21, 2017. www.nytimes.com.
Degeling, Martin, and Bettina Berendt. 2018. “What Is Wrong about Robocops as Con-
sultants? A Technology- Centric Critique of Predictive Policing.” AI & SOCIETY 33 
(3): 347– 56.
Dumke, Mike, and Frank Main. 2017. “A Look Inside the Watch List Chicago Police Fought 
to Keep Secret.” Chicago Sun- Times, May 18, 2017. https://chicago.suntimes.com.
Eck, John E., Spencer Chainey, James G. Cameron, Michael Leitner, and Ronald E. 
Wilson. 2005. Mapping Crime: Understanding Hot Spots. Washington, DC: National 
Institute of Justice.
290 | Daniel  Susser
Eck, John E., and Dennis P. Rosenbaum. 1994. “The New Police Order: Effectiveness, 
Equity, and Efficiency in Community Policing.” In The Challenge of Community 
Policing: Testing the Promises, edited by Dennis Rosenbaum, 3– 24. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: SAGE Publications.
Ensign, Danielle, Sorelle A. Friedler, Scott Neville, Carlos Scheidegger, and Suresh 
Venkatasubramanian. 2018. “Runaway Feedback Loops in Predictive Policing.” 
Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 81:1– 12.
Ferguson, Andrew Guthrie. 2016. “Predictive Prosecution.” Wake Forest Law Review 51 
(3): 705– 44.
Ferguson, Andrew Guthrie. 2017a. “Policing Predictive Policing.” Washington Univer-
sity Law Review 94 (5): 1109– 89.
Ferguson, Andrew Guthrie. 2017b. The Rise of Big Data Policing: Surveillance, Race, and 
the Future of Law Enforcement. New York: New York University Press.
Ferguson, Andrew Guthrie. 2017c. “Police Are Using Algorithms to Tell Them If You’re 
a Threat.” Time, October 3, 2017. http://time.com/
Friedman, Batya, and Helen Nissenbaum. 1996. “Bias in Computer Systems.” ACM 
Transactions on Information Systems 14 (3): 330– 47.
Goldstein, Herman. 1977. Policing a Free Society. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Gorner, Jeremy. 2013. “Chicago Police Use ‘Heat List’ as Strategy to Prevent Violence.” 
Chicago Tribune, August 21, 2013. www.chicagotribune.com.
Gregory, Nathan. 2005. “Offender Profiling: A Review of the Literature.” British Journal 
of Forensic Practice 7 (3): 29– 34.
Hall, Jerome. 1953. “Police and Law in a Democratic Society.” Indiana Law Journal 28 
(2): 133– 77.
Harcourt, Bernard E. 2007. Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an 
Actuarial Age. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Harries, Keith. 1999. Mapping Crime: Principle and Practice. Washington, DC: National 
Institute of Justice.
Haskins, Caroline, and Jason Koebler. 2019. “Dozens of Cities Have Secretly Experi-
mented with Predictive Policing Software.” Motherboard, February 6, 2019. https://
motherboard.vice.com/
Hosein, Adam Omar. 2018. “Racial Profiling and a Reasonable Sense of Inferior  
Political Status.” Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (3): e1– e20.
Joh, Elizabeth E. 2016. “The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big 
Data, and Policing.” Harvard Law & Policy Review 10 (1): 15– 42.
Kerr, Ian, and Jessica Earle. 2013. “Prediction, Preemption, Presumption.” Stanford Law 
Review Online 66 (September): n.p. www.stanfordlawreview.org/
Kutnowski, Moish. 2017. “The Ethical Dangers and Merits of Predictive Policing.” Jour-
nal of Community Safety & Well- Being 2 (1): 13– 17.
Latour, Bruno. 2005. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor- Network- 
Theory. Clarendon Lectures in Management Studies. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Predictive  Policing  and  the  Ethics  of  Preemption  | 291
Lippert- Rasmussen, Kasper. 2011. “‘We Are All Different’: Statistical Discrimination 
and the Right to Be Treated as an Individual.” Journal of Ethics 15 (1– 2): 47– 59.
Lippert- Rasmussen, Kasper. 2014. Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry into 
the Nature of Discrimination. New York: Oxford University Press.
Llenas, Bryan. 2014. “Brave New World of ‘Predictive Policing’ Raises Specter of High- 
Tech Racial Profiling.” Fox News, February 25, 2014. www.foxnews.com/
Lum, Kristian, and William Isaac. 2016. “To Predict and Serve?” Significance 13 (5): 
14– 19.
Maguire, Mike. 2000. “Policing by Risks and Targets: Some Dimensions and Implica-
tions of Intelligence- Led Crime Control.” Policing and Society 9 (4): 315– 36.
McCulloch, Jude, and Dean Wilson. 2016. Pre- Crime: Pre- Emption, Precaution and the 
Future. London: Routledge.
Nhan, Johnny. 2013. “Police Culture.” In The Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal 
Justice, edited by Jay S Albanese, 1– 6. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.
Pasquale, Frank. 2015. The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money 
and Information. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pearsall, Beth. 2010. “Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement?” NIJ Journal 
266: 16– 19.
Perry, Walt L., Brian McInnis, Carter C. Price, Susan C. Smith, and John S. Hollywood. 
2013. Predictive Policing: The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Opera-
tions. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Pinch, Trevor J., and Wiebe E. Bijker. 1984. “The Social Construction of Facts and 
Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might 
Benefit Each Other.” Social Studies of Science 14 (3): 399– 441.
Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2008. Intelligence- Led Policing. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing.
Rich, Michael L. 2016. “Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the 
Fourth Amendment.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 164 (4): 871– 929.
Risse, Mathias, and Richard Zeckhauser. 2004. “Racial Profiling.” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 32 (2): 131– 70.
Robinson, David, and Logan Koepke. 2016. Stuck in a Pattern: Early Evidence on ‘Pre-
dictive Policing’ and Civil Rights. Upturn. www.upturn.org/
Rosenblat, Alex, Tamara Kneese, and danah boyd. 2014. “Predicting Human Behavior.” 
Data & Society Research Institute. https://datasociety.net.
Schauer, Frederick F. 2003. Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes. Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Schauer, Frederick F. 2018. “Statistical (and Non- Statistical) Discrimination.” In The 
Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination, edited by Kasper Lippert- 
Rasmussen, 42– 53. London: Routledge.
Schmidt, Christine. 2018. “Holding Algorithms (and the People Behind Them) Account-
able Is Still Tricky, but Doable.” Nieman Lab, March 21, 2018. www.niemanlab.org.
Selbst, Andrew D. 2017. “Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing.” Georgia Law Review 
52 (1): 109– 95.
292 | Daniel  Susser
Shapiro, Aaron. 2017. “Reform Predictive Policing.” Nature News 541 (7638): 458– 60.
Sheehey, Bonnie. 2019. “Algorithmic Paranoia: The Temporal Governmentality of Pre-
dictive Policing.” Ethics and Information Technology 21 (1): 49– 58.
Stroud, Matt. 2014. “The Minority Report: Chicago’s New Police Computer Predicts 
Crimes, but Is It Racist?” The Verge, February 19, 2014. www.theverge.com.
Tayebi, Mohammad, and Uwe Glässer. 2016. Social Network Analysis in Predictive Polic-
ing. New York: Springer.
Turvey, Brent E. 2012. Criminal Profiling: An Introduction to Behavioral Evidence Analy-
sis, 4th ed. Burlington, MA: Academic Press.
Uchida, Craig. 2005. “The Development of the American Police: An Historical Over-
view.” In Critical Issues in Policing: Contemporary Readings, 5th ed., edited by Roger 
G. Dunham and Geoffrey P. Alpert. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
Walsh, William F. 2005. “Compstat: An Analysis of an Emerging Police Managerial 
Program.” In Critical Issues in Policing: Contemporary Readings, 5th ed., edited by 
Roger G. Dunham and Geoffrey P. Alpert. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
Walsh, William F., and Gennaro F. Vito. 2004. “The Meaning of Compstat: Analysis 
and Response.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 20 (1): 51– 69.
Willis, James J., Stephen D. Mastrofski, and David Weisburd. 2004. Compstat in Prac-
tice: An In- Depth Analysis of Three Cities. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.
Willis, James J., Stephen D. Mastrofski, and David Weisburd. 2007. “Making Sense of 
COMPSTAT: A Theory- Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police 
Departments.” Law & Society Review 41 (1): 147– 88.
Winner, Langdon. 1980. “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” Daedalus 109 (1): 121– 36.
Zarsky, Tal. 2013. “Transparent Predictions.” University of Illinois Law Review 2013 (4): 
1503– 69.
